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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case is about a mistake of fact made by a hunter, who was doing his best to keep the law,
despite its complexity. But how can one keep the law when the law is unclear or in this case
unknown? "Everyone knows 'ignorance of the law is no excuse,'" stated the prosecutor to the
jury. "\Ve are all expected to know and keep the law!" Does this mean that citizens should
faithfully study all of Idaho's statutes and rules in order to know and keep the law? Maybe it
would be wise for all Idahoans to own a copy ofIdaho's Criminal Code book and faithfully
study it along with all IDAP A rules.

In a country whose laws are based on Judeo-Christian beliefs, some things are understood. Thou
shall not steal. Thou shall not murder. Thou shall not lie. But should a hunter be expected to
know that elk hunting is allowed in only one selected zone in 2010, when the tradition of law for
decades has allowed hunters to hunt wherever there was an open season? Clearly hunters cannot
be expected to research Idaho code to know the law. That is why the legislature requires
whenever there is a rule change it be published [clearly] in an official proclamation of the
agency's rules. The Idaho Fish and Game is required by law to clearly notify the public of any
rule changes in its official proclamation known as the "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules"
and then distribute it liberally and free. In matter of fact, most hunters rely exclusively on this
publication to understand the law. It is then logical that if there is a rule of consequence not only
will it be "in" the brochure, but it will be crystal clear. The magistrate ruled and the district court
affirmed that whether the proclamation clearly notified the hunters or not was a matter of law. In
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

Page 1

this they were in error. Whether the law requires the hunters be properly notified in an official
proclamation or not is a matter of law; whether the brochure did that is a matter of fact and
should have been a question for the jury.

But the case goes much deeper than whether the proclamation gave sufficient notice to the
appellant; the case puts on trial the perverted doctrine of "general intent and malum prohibitum
crimes." For decades agencies like the Idaho Fish and Game have turned minor regulatory
violations into full blown crimes, while still retaining the low burden of proof that only requires
the commission of an act. They have through crafty prosecutors and unwise justices eliminated
the element of criminal intent or criminal negligence, even though by law it is a required element
in "every" crime. Furthermore, this case exposes the widely and wrongly accepted doctrine that
"ignorance and/or mistake of fact of the law is no excuse." It is an excuse and can be found in
Idaho law!
This case is a glaring indictment of the corruption of the criminal justice system in Idaho and the
abuse of power by agencies like the Idaho Fish and Game. It puts on full display the meaning of
a "Kangaroo" court. Unbelievably, the Defendant was precluded by "Order" from bringing forth
any evidence that would acquit him. The only statement he was allowed to make was, yes, he
killed a cow elk in the Tex Creek Zone; an admission he had made publicly and honestly on day
1. If that was the entire defense the Defendant was allowed to make, why even have a trial? In

fact, the State argued a trial was not necessary; the Defendant had already admitted to the crime
and all the crime required was the commission of an illegal act. However, the magistrate, feeling
some semblance of due process was needed, held a trial, if it could be called that. After all, the
hypocrisy of Idaho's criminal justice system does have its limits.
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Finally, if being silenced wasn't enough, the prosecutor corruptly displayed a "made-up" tag that
was entered into evidence, given to the jury, and then covered up as if it had never been admitted
by the Court Clerk. How much more corruption could possibly exist in one case? And for the
Defendant's vehement protest against the corruption, the court gave the defendant five days in
jail and a Contempt of Court misdemeanor for handing out a paper explaining to jurors their right
to vote their conscience. If ever there was a case of injustice it now sits before Idaho State
Supreme Court. God give Idaho's highest court the wisdom to see this.

Course and Proceedings Below
On December 7, 2010, a Criminal Complaint was filed charging Mr. Rammell with Possession
of Game Unlawfully Taken, a misdemeanor, pursuant to Idaho Code 36-502(b).
On April 14, 2011, the State filed a Motion in Limine, which would preclude the Defendant from
attempting to admit any evidence of his intent. The State argued the "crime charged is a general
intent crime and does not require any specific intent.
On April 20, 2011, the magistrate "ordered that there shall be no evidence presented by
defendant concerning his intent or lack of intent to violate the law or his knowledge or lack of
knowledge concerning elk hunting rules and regulations. Defendant shall not be permitted to
introduce any evidence as to what Defendant alleges was stated to him by any representative of
Sportsman's Warehouse or by anyone with regard to hunting laws and regulations, including but
not limited to the use of an elk "A" tag."
On April 21, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the Criminal Complaint was
insufficient. In response, the State filed a Motion to Amend on April 23, 2011.
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On April 25, 2011, the Defendant filed an objection to the State's proposed jury instruction
concerning IDAPA 13.0.08255 and a Motion to Reconsider Admissibility of Intent Evidence.
The Defendant argued that the jury should not be instructed that IDAPA 13.0.08255 stands alone
as the state of Idaho law without instructing them "that the Department of Fish and Game's
IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010, consistent with Idaho Code 36-105 (3)(c), 'shall
be text of the [Department of Fish and Game's] proclamation to hunters." The Defendant also
argued that "pursuant to the same statute, the magistrate court and the jury 'shall' take judicial
notice of the 'proclamation, pamphlet, or brochure. '" The Defendant's argument for his Motion
to Reconsider requested the magistrate court to reconsider the Order on the admissibility of
intent evidence in light of the United States Supreme Court case Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600 (1994).
The State filed a 2nd Motion in Limine on April 25, 2011. The State requested a ruling by the
magistrate court that the Defendant be precluded from calling any witnesses or introducing any
exhibits at trial. The State also argued that the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010
"should be precluded on the ground that it presents a legal issue for the Court and not the jury."
On April 25, 2011, the magistrate court issued its "Order" on the various motions filed by the
State and Defendant. The court noted that it previously "ruled that intent was irrelevant based
upon the case law presented and its belief that mistake of law is not a defense to a general intent
crime." Emphasis added.

The court further states that "this is a regulatory issue and the

difference between malum in se and malum prohibitum crimes is applicable in the case.
Regulatory crimes generally do not require any specific intent other than to do the act
complained of." The court found the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was not well founded
based upon the Amended Complaint and the reasons for not allowing it. Finally, the magistrate
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court addressed what it deemed to be applicable law in the case.

Specifically, the court

addressed the Defendant's argument that there was not sufficient notice. The court found that it
could not "find sufficient incongruence between the regulations and the publication to invalidate
the charges pending herein." It concluded that as the question of the applicability of the law is a
question for the court, "in this case the Court finds little difference between the IDAPA
regulations and that described in the publication.

The IDAP A regulations being the actual

regulation it is that which should be given to the jury. How that law applies to the facts of the
case is the province of the jury."
On May 11, 2011, Defendant filed two motions and argued that the magistrate court lacked
personal, territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because "Rex Rammell is
outside the de facto jurisdiction with proper standing in the de jure state of Idaho." The motions
were heard and denied on May 25, 2011.
On May 31, 2011, Defendant filed an Objection to jury instructions and a Motion to Reconsider.
Defendant argued that he should be allowed to present his theory to the jury that he lacked the
criminal intent or criminal negligence as required by law to be found guilty of the charged crime.
The magistrate court issued its Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider on July 1,2011. The
magistrate court upheld its previous ruling on the intent issues, explaining again that case law
clearly establishes that the crime that Defendant was charged with is a general intent crime,
which does not require proof of criminal intent or criminal negligence.

A jury trial was held

on June 30, 2011, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on
July 1,2011. The matter came before the District Court on January 23,2012. The District Court
affirmed the Magistrate Court's Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 29, 2012.
A Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was filed on March 15,2012.
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Statement of Facts
November 30, 2010, appellant successfully hunted and killed a cow elk on the last day of the
season in the Tex Creek Zone east ofIdaho Falls. Previouslv he had unsuccessfullv hunted the
"'

"'

back country of the Middle Fork Zone north of Yellow Pine. Unknown to the appellant, the
Idaho Department ofFish and Game had made a rule change in 1999 allowing only one zone to
be selected and hunted per year for elk. This was unknown to the appellant due to a decade's
absence from elk hunting and because "nowhere" in the Big Game Rules section of the "IDAHO
BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" was the zone limitation mentioned, let alone stated l . See
IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010, Big Game Rules, P. 64

72, Defendant's Exhibit

A; marked, but not admitted. Prior to the rule change for decades elk hunters had been allowed
to hunt in any area of the state as long as a season was open. This is still the method of general
hunting for all species except elk. See IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010, Seasons,
Deer p. 8-26, Black Bear p. 56-60, and Mountain Lion p. 61-63.
Mr. Rammell believing he had legally taken a cow elk proceeded to his truck while dragging his
elk behind his snow machine. Holding a valid license and a punched and validated elk tag he
respectfully stopped at a game check station on the road. See Trial transcript p. 47 line 8-22.
To his great surprise the officer announced that the tag was not valid in that zone.

Mr. Rammell

asked the officer ifhe would show him the rule in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules
2010 brochure, which limited hunters to only one zone. See Trial transcript p. 51 line 11

18.

The officer thumbed through the brochure and stated he could not find it, but assured Mr.
Rammell it was the rule.

1. The Big Game Rules p. 64 -72 of the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010, makes no mention of the
IDAPA rule. The only place an ambiguous statement can be found is in the seldom read general comments section.
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Trial tr. p. 54 line 18 - 22.

Q (By Mr. Rammell) When I asked you if you could show me in the rule book where it
says it was illegal to hunt in more than one zone, all you did is show me the zones; is that
correct?
A (By Officer Kelsey) That's correct.

After a confrontation over confiscation of the elk and a false report to his superior officer, which
claimed Rammell threatened to kill him if he took the elk, two Fish and Game officers, two
deputy sheriffs, and two state policemen showed up at Mr. Rammell' s home, took possession of
the elk, and issued him a citation.

Idaho Law
IC§18-114: UNION OF ACT AND INTENT. In every crime or public offense there must
exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, !!.!. criminal negligence. Emphasis added.
History: [18-114, added 1972, ch. 336, sec. 1, p. 848.]

IC§18-115: MANIFESTATION OF INTENT. Intent or intention

IS

manifested by the

commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the offense. Emphasis
added.
History: [I.e., sec. 18-115, as added by 1972, ch. 336, sec. 1, p. 848; am. 1994, ch. 131, sec. 1,
p.296.]

IC§18-201: PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES. All persons are capable of
committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes:
1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under an ignorance or

mistake o[[act, which disproves any criminal intent.
2. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof.
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3. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through misfortune or

by accident. when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable
negligence. Emphasis added.
History: [I.C., sec. 18-201, as added by 1972, ch. 336, sec. 1, p. 849.]

IC§18-11l.

FELONY, MISDEMEANOR AND INFRACTION DEFINED. A felony is a

crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. An infraction is a
civil public offense, not constituting a crime, which is punishable only by a penalty not
exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) and for which no period of incarceration may be imposed.
Every other crime is a misdemeanor. ..
History: [18-111, added 1972, ch. 336, sec. 1, p. 848; am. 1982, ch. 353, sec. 6, p. 878.]
IC § 36-105 (3)(c). The proclamation shall be published in a pamphlet or brochure as provided
in section 59-1012, Idaho Code, and distributed without charge to the public. The text ofthe
proclamation published in a pamphlet or brochure shall be the official text of the proclamation.
Judicial notice shall be taken of the proclamation pamphlet or brochure.

II.

ISSUES OF APPEAL
A.

Whether the doctrine of general intent and mala prohibitum crimes is contrary to Idaho

Codes § 18-114, §18-115, and §18-201.
B.

Whether the Idaho State Supreme Court in State v. Simpson, State v. Wimer and State v.

Keller was in error. \Vhether Idaho Code §36-502(b) as interpreted by the Courts to mean the
element of intent [mens rea] is not required is correct or whether the element of intent [mens rea]
or criminal negligence as required by Idaho Code § 18-114 and clarified in Idaho Code §18-115
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and Idaho Code § 18-201 in "every" crime is implied in accordance with Staples v. The United
States (1994).

C.

Whether the lower court committed plain error by failing to require the element of

criminal negligence as an alternative in the jury instructions as required by Idaho Code § 18-114.
D.

Whether the lower court committed plain error by failing to allow the defendant his right

to present his theory of defense, based on Idaho codes § 18-114, § 18-115, and § 18-201, in
violation of his due process rights. Whether the Defendant's theory of his case, evidenced as a
matter of law, was or was not presented to the jury under proper instruction. Whether the Order
granting the State's Motion in Limine violated the Defendant's right to due process of law by
suppressing evidence.
E.

Whether the lower court committed plain error by precluding from evidence the "IDAHO

BIG GAME Season and Rules 2010" brochure, while allowing the Plaintiff to admit his marked
sections.
F.

Whether it was error to deny the Defendant the opportunity to present his defense of

mistake of fact, which disproves criminal intent or criminal negligence based on detrimental
reliance upon the publication "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010", a brochure which
is the State's "official text" of the hunting rules. Whether the limited questioning allowed by the
Court in cross examination of the State's witness as to the brochure "IDAHO BIG GAME
Seasons and Rules 2010" was a denial of Defendant's Constitutional due process right to
confront witnesses against him. Whether the "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010"
brochure was material evidence as to Defendant's intent and exhibited a failure of the Idaho Fish
and Game to properly notify hunters of rule changes. Whether or not, the brochure's exclusion
from evidence was a denial of defendant's due process rights.
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G.

Whether the lower court committed plain error when it failed to dismiss based on a lack

of personal, territorial, and/or subject matter jurisdiction.

III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"On the question of whether evidence is relevant, this Court reviews the trial court's ruling de
novo." State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P. 2d 596, 602 (1993). State v. Robinett,
141 Idaho 110,112, 106 P.3d 436,438 (2005). "[T]he determination as to whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied is freely reviewed." State v. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64, 66, 156 P.3d
565, 567 (2007).

IV.
ARGUMENT
ISSUES A, B, C.
A.

Whether the doctrine of general intent and mala prohibitum crimes is contrary to

Idaho Codes § 18-114, § 18-115, and § 18-201.
B.

Whether the Idaho State Supreme Court in State v. Simpson, 137 Idaho 813, 817, 54

P.3d 456, 460 (Ct. App. 2002), State v. Wimer, 118 Idaho 732, 800 P.2d 128 (Ct App. 1990)
and State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. 1051, (1902) was in error. Whether Idaho Code

§ 36-502(b) as interpreted by the Courts to mean the element of intent [mens rea] is not
required is correct or whether the element of intent [mens rea] or criminal negligence as
required by Idaho Code § 18-114 and clarified in Idaho Code § 18-115 and Idaho Code §
18-201 in "every" crime is implied in accordance with Staples v. The United States (1994).
C.

Whether the lower court committed plain error by failing to require the element of
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criminal negligence as an alternative in the jury instructions as required by Idaho Code

§ 18-114.
The "Order" precluded the Defendant from presenting evidence as to his lack of [criminal] intent
or criminal negligence "with regard to hunting laws and regulations," contrary to Idaho Law: see
Order Re: State's Motion in Limine, VoLl

43. Idaho law requires a union or joint operation of

act and [criminal] intent or criminal negligence in "every" crime. The lower Court made an error
by not requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of [criminal] intent or
criminal negligence in order to prove a violation of law.

IC § 18-114: UNION OF ACT AND INTENT. In "every" crime or public offense there must
exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, Q! criminal negligence. Emphasis added.

IC § 18-115:

MANIFESTATION OF INTENT. Intent or intention is manifested by the

commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the offense. Emphasis
added.

IC § 18-201: PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES. All persons are capable
of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes:

1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under an ignorance or

mistake o[[act, which disproves any criminal intent.
2. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof
3. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through misfortune or

by accident, when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable
negligence. Emphasis added.

IC lS-114's "intent", taken in conjunction with IC lS-115 and IC IS-201, clearly means criminal
or evil intent, the "mens rea" or guilty mind element of "every" crime. When interpreting a
statute, the appellate court strives to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent for its
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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enactment.
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 263m 207 P.3d 988, 994 (2009).
"When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and effect to the legislature's
intent in passing the statute." Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870
P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). "It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole."
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813,135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006)
(citations omitted). "Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v.
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685,688 (1999). However, if the result is "palpably
absurd," this Court must engage in statutory construction. Id. When engaging in statutory
construction, this Court has a "duty to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect to that
intent." Id. "[T]he Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of
applicable statutes together to determine tlte intent oUlte legislature." Davaz, 125 Idaho at
336,870 P.2d at 1295 (internal citation omitted). "[The Court] also must take account of all
other matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the
statute." Id. Emphasis added.

The Appellant/defendant claimed he was improperly notified that his tag was limited to only one
zone in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure, the Idaho State Fish and
Game's "official text," creating a defense of "ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any
criminal intent" or "criminal negligence." See Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion in
Limine and Motion to Dismiss, VoLl -50, and Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 5-18-2011,
VoLl -122. The Motions to Dismiss and Reconsider were erroneously denied. See Court's
Order on Motions, VoLl -63, and Court's Order on Motion to Reconsider, VoLl -163.
Curiously, the "Order" was reconsidered with no explanation why the United States Supreme
Court decision in Staples v. United States, (92-1441), 511 U.S. 600 (1994), had no bearing on the
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case. Staples, is applicable to the case through the due process clause of the 5th and 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution. According to Staples, "silence on this point
[intent] by itself does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a
conventional mens rea element, which would require that the defendant know the facts that make
his conduct illegal." See Defendant's Objection To Instructing The Jury That Idaho's
Administrative Rule Stands Alone as the State of Idaho Law and Motion to Reconsider
Admissibility ofIntent Evidence, VoU -74.

The Court made an error by incorrectly instructing the jury in regards to the element of

"intent" .

Final Jury Instruction No. 14. See VoU -172
"In every crime or public offense, there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent.
The word "intent" does not mean an intent to commit a crime, but merely the intent to knowingly
perform the interdicted act."

Note: The first sentence is verbatim ofIe 18-114, minus "or criminal negligence."

This jury instruction is so confusing it effectively eliminated the elements of [criminal] intent
and criminal negligence, contrary to Idaho Law. It distorts the true meaning of intent [criminal)
and doesn't even include criminal negligence. Furthermore, how can a person "knowingly
perform the interdicted (prohibited) act" without having "an intent to commit a crime," unless a
mistake is made? It is not possible! The Idaho legislature clarifies the answer to this question in
the following law. It is repeated for convenience and emphasis.
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IC 18-201: PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES. All persons are capable of
committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes:
4. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under all ignorance
or mistake offact, which disproves any criminal intent.
5. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof.
6. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through misfortul1e or
by accident, whel1 it appears that there was not evil design. intention or culpable
negligence. Emphasis added.

The State argued in its Motion in Limine, VoLl -36, p. 1, that "All the State need prove is that
defendant was found in possession of an illegally obtained elk. Defendant's mens rea is not an
issue in this case." This argument relies upon State v. Simpson, 2002, who relies on State v.
Wimer, 1990, and State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. 1051 (1902) as supporting cases. In
Simpson, Keller is quoted from 1902:

"Wicked or willful intent to violate the criminal law is not an essential ingredient in every
criminal offense." (maybe it wasn't in 1902) "And that is so in statutory offenses when the
statute does not make the intent with which an act is done an ingredient of the crime. The rule is
that in acts mala in se the intent governs, and in acts mala prohibita, the intent does not govern,
and the only inquiry is, 'Has the law been violated?'" Comment in parentheses added.

Note: Idaho Codes 18-111, 18-114, 18-115, and 18-201 were added in "1972" to correct
the law. However, the courts have continued to use Keller, (1902), for case law precedent.
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Magistrate Clark stated, "This is a regulatory issue and difference between malum in se and
malum prohibitum crimes is applicable in this case. Regulatory crimes generally do not require
any specific intent other than to do the act complained of." See Court's Order on Motions, VoU
-63, page 2. The State argued and the lower court concurred that "The crime charged is a general
intent crime and does not require any specific intent." See State's Motion in Limine. In other
words, that Idaho code 36-502(b) is a mala prohibita act because there is no "specific intent"
wording, therefore, intent does not govern. In an attempt to align so called mala prohibita acts in
statutes, which do not legally exist, with the mandate set forth in Idaho Code 18-114, that in
"every" crime there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent or criminal negligence,
the tenn "general intent crime" had been created. Ironically, "general intent" means no intent at
all or mala prohibita. The State in an attempt to justify the removal of the element of [criminal]
intent or criminal negligence of "every" crime stated, "Basically, all that is required is the
'intent' to do the act." See State's Motion in Limine, p. 1. This reasoning is a perversion of
Idaho Law that apparently dates back to Keller in 1902. It certainly is contrary to IC 18-114
(1972), unconstitutionally denies due process, and sets the stage for easy convictions. For this
reason Appellant appeals this case to Idaho's highest court.

Magistrate Clark went further stating, "The Court had ruled that intent was irrelevant based upon
the case law presented and its belief that mistake of law is not a defense to a general intent
crime." See Court's Order on Motions, p.2. To the contrary, the Court then included ajury
instruction requiring a union of act and intent, but stated, "The word 'intent' does not mean an
intent to commit a crime." This language was used intentionally to so confuse the jury that there
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was no means by which they could understand the jury instruction or have any hope of following
the law according to IC 18-114,18-11

18-210. This begs the question, "Why did the magistrate

include a jury instruction on intent after ruling to preclude it from evidence and argument, if
intent was not an element ofthe case? The Appellant believes the instruction was given to try to
meet the mandate found in IC 18-114. The Appellant believes the magistrate was so perplexed
by the situation, which is what happens when case law contradicts Idaho statutes, that in his
attempt to weave unweavable case law with Idaho statutes, he only further confused the process.
Appellant believes this is why the magistrate asked repeatedly that the Defendant plead guilty
and appeal the case, stating that he "tended to agree" on many of the arguments, but was
constrained by case law. The Appellant also believes the magistrate's conscience was revealed
by his actions following sentencing to partially stay the sentence, then in a hearing on December
1, 2011 to stay the entire sentence based upon the results of the appeal.

Furthermore, "mistake of law" and "mistake of fact" are not the same. As argued by the State, a
general intent crime is a mala prohibita act according to the magistrate and case law. However, a
mala prohibita act cannot be a crime, because it lacks the required elements of [criminal] intent
or criminal negligence. Therefore, "mistake of fact" is a defense to this crime, because it
disproves [criminal] intent or criminal negligence.

There are many problems with both the State's arguments and the Court's rulings.
1. Possession of Unlawfully Taken Wildlife is a statute predicated upon a regulation. Judge
Clark was partially correct in stating, "Regulatory crimes generally do not require any
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specific intent other than the act complained of." The part that is incorrect is that
regulatory violations are infractions, not crimes, if all they require is the act.

Ie 18-111. FELONY, MISDEMEANOR AND INFRACTION DEFINED. A felony is
a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. An
infraction is a civil public offense, not constituting a crime, which is punishable only by a
penalty not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) and for which no period of
incarceration may be imposed. Every other crime is a misdemeanor ...

Was the tag used by the defendant invalid? Yes; IDAPA is clear on this matter, even
though the defendant argues the "official text" of the proclamation is not. Could the
defendant be charged with a regulatory infraction without the State having to prove his
intent? Theoretically, yes. However, the fines could not exceed $100.00, nor could there
be any jail time. See IC 18-111. The problem here is that, if anything, an infraction
occurred, but the Idaho Fish and Game and the prosecution elevated it to a misdemeanor
to assist in the vindictive prosecution of the Defendant and past Defendants who have
violated their rules. The State and Court errors in removing the [criminal] intent or
criminal negligence element requirement of the statute! Did the defendant criminally
intend to possess an elk unlawfully? No; no such intent was shown by the State as
required by law. Or was the defendant criminally negligent for not knowing that his tag
was invalid? No; because the official Idaho State brochure was not clear that the
defendant's tag was not valid in another zone. This burden justly should have rested on
the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the [criminal] intent or criminal negligence
ofthe defendant in accordance with IC 18-114, 18-115, 18-201, and 18-111, which
allows for criminal punishment to include larger fines and jail time. The fact that the
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State chose not to enter such proof, demonstrates that no such evidence existed. If the
Idaho Fish and Game and other agencies had to prove criminal intent or criminal
negligence in order or to convict persons of crimes, most of their cases would never make
it to trial and very few would ever be appealed.
2. General intent or the intent merely to commit an act as argued by the State is not the same
as criminal or evil intent to commit an act as required by law to commit a crime. IC 18114 in conjunction with 18-115 and 18-201 makes this clear. The [criminal] intent or
criminal negligence element of "every" crime, including the misdemeanor defendant was
charged with, must be proven. The act of shooting an elk out of one zone and placing
upon it a tag issued for use in another zone, when previously this was allowed, is not
enough when the State changed the law, but failed to clearly inform the public of the law
change in its "official" brochure. It is time the Court clears this up. There is only one
type of intent if Wheeler is used and that is criminal intent!

The Court's opinion in Wheeler bears repeating:

"[T]he Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of applicable
statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature. Davaz 125 Idaho at 336,870
P.2d at 1295. "[The Court] also must take account of all other matters such as the
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statute."

The legislature makes no distinction between general and specific intent, only the courts.
Furthermore, just because a statute omits specific intent language does not mean the
element of criminal intent or criminal negligence is removed as required by IC 18-114
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and as stated in Staples. Idaho Code was perverted by the court in Keller and agencies
and prosecutors have taken advantage ever since.
3. Idaho Code does offer an alternative to the requirement of criminal intent; criminal
negligence. Should the defendant have known that his tag was invalid in the Tex Creek
zone? Of course to answer this question, the defendant should have been permitted to
present evidence of the failure of the Idaho Fish and Game to properly notify hunters of
the rule change, which limits hunters to one zone only. To do this the IDAHO BIG
GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure, the "official text" of the proclamation, should
have been admitted into evidence and argued so that the jury could have decided the
question of fact, whether the defendant was misled by the State or whether he had
criminal intent or criminal negligence.
4. One cannot unlawfully (criminally) possess wildlife unless one criminally intends to do
so. This is foundational law throughout America. If I pick someone else's coat up after a
party, having mistaken it as my own, I cannot be charged with theft, because for an act to
be criminal there must also exist criminal intent, i.e., intent to permanently deprive
unlawfully. The act alone is not enough! Dick Cheney was not criminally prosecuted for
aggravated battery when he mistakenly shot his friend while hunting. Shooting another
person does not become a crime simply by the act. It becomes a crime when a person
criminally intends to do so. In this case, it is not a crime to possess an elk, even one
taken with an invalid tag, unless one criminally intended to do so. It may be against a
regulation and an infraction (no requirement of intent), but the act alone does not make it
a crime. If a person is prosecuted simply for doing a minor act that is contrary to a rule, it
should properly be termed an infraction with a penalty of less than $100 dollars.
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However, when a person is charged with a crime, a misdemeanor in this case, which
carries substantial fines and jail time, the requirement for the State to prove not only that
an unlawful act was committed, but also that criminal intent or a guilty mind or criminal
negligence must also be proven in order to comply with due process requirements. For
the court to have viewed this as a regulatory crime, like a speeding ticket, which
according to the court removes the element of criminal intent, is unjust, unfair and
prejudicial to Defendant's due process rights because the court asked the jury to convict
the defendant of a statutory crime with statutory penalties. It was not fair to the jury or
the defendant. The burden of proof should have been equal to the charge. It was an error
by the Court to lower the burden of proof for the State as if it were a speeding ticket, and
then punish the defendant with a misdemeanor with statutory penalties. Either the State's
burden of proof (must prove criminal intent or criminal negligence) should have been
equal to the statutory punishment ($1500 fine, plus the loss of the elk $1000, a 2 year
suspension of hunting license, and five days jail time, in addition to the damage to the
defendant's reputation, time, and trouble defending himself) or the defendant's
punishment should have been equal to the State's low level of burden of proof (e.g., less
than $100 for infractions and no jailor loss oflicense).

ARGUMENT OF ISSUE D.
D.

The Defendant's theory of the case, evidenced as a matter of law, was not presented to

the jury under proper instruction.
"A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to have his or her theory of the case submitted to the
jury under proper instructions." State of Idaho v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 90, 831 P.2d 555, 558
(1992).
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In discussing a trial courts obligations the Idaho Supreme Court stated the following:

"If the theory is not supported by the evidence, then the court must reject the instruction. But if
the theory is supported by the evidence, then the court must determine if the instruction is a
correct statement of law. If it is a correct statement, then the instruction should be given. But if
the instruction is incorrect, then the trial court is under the affirmative duty to properly instruct
the jury. In this manner, the defendant is still under the obligation to bring forth his or her theory
or theories to the attention of the court. The trial court is not obligated to determine on its own
upon what theory or theories to instruct the jury on. It is the petitioners request to be heard
according to his theory or theories according to the laws o(the state. " Emphasis added.

Appellant/defendant's theories are that the he lacked either the [criminal] intent or the criminal
negligence required by law, IC. 18-114, 18-115, 18-201, to unlawfully possess wildlife and that
the wording in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure, which hunters in
Idaho rely on explicitly as the "official text" for explanations of the "details" of the laws and
rules of the Idaho Fish and Game, is not consistent with the language codified in IDAP A, leading
to "ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves criminal intent" or "criminal negligence."

The evidence required by Eastman is a matter of law and is incontrovertible. \Vhat evidence
does the defendant's theories rely upon? Idaho Law! Appellant/defendant argues just because
the word intent is not explicitly stated in IC 36-502(b), does not mean it is not an implied
element as per Staples. In fact it must be! Furthermore, the words "taken or killed unlawfully"
surely imply evil or criminal intent! Idaho codes 36-502(b) taken together with 18-114, 18-115,
and 18-201, is clear; criminal (evil) intent or criminal negligence is a required element to
possess wildlife unlawfully taken.
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IDAHO CODE 18-115 MANIFESTATION OF INTENT. Intent or intention is manifested by
the commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the offense.
The Court has ruled that the intent element of 36-502(b), is fulfilled simply by the act of
possession.

This statute makes it clear that the surrounding circumstances, (ambiguity and

vagueness created in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure), in addition to
"the commission of the acts" are required to determine "manifestations of intent," leading to
ignorance and a mistake of fact as a legal defense to the charges. What were the surrounding
circumstances? Defendant was precluded from presenting any evidence for his defense to be
considered by the jury.
The following final jury instructions were in error as argued in Defendant's Objection's To Jury
Instructions, prior to closing arguments.

Final Jury Instruction #10.
"In order for an animal to be unlawfully taken, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the following:
1. That the animal was a game animal protected under the laws of the State of Idaho.
2. That the animal was taken or killed in a manner in violation of the regulations or laws
of the State ofIdaho.
3. That an elk is a game animal protected under the laws of the State ofIdaho.
The defendant requested the following language be inserted in the instruction, but was
denied in error:
"In order for an animal to be unlawfully taken, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the following:
"That the animal was taken or killed in a manner in violation of the regulation or laws of the
State ofIdaho as detailed in the "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" brochure.
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Final Jury Instruction #13.
"In order for an elk to be lawfully taken or killed, the following must be complied with:"
ELK ZONE A AND B TAGS
1. Elk Zone A Tag. The Elk Zone A Tag is valid for specified A Tag elk seasons
within a specified elk zone only.
2. Elk Zone B Tag. The Elk Zone B Tag is valid for specified B Tag elk seasons
within a specified elk zone only.
The Court was in error by only putting into the final jury instructions the above IDAP A when
contrary information was contained in the brochure delivered by the Department to the general
public, of which Defendant is one. Having the conflicted public material works an estoppel
against the State. Where two conflicting or unclear statements of the laws are published by the
State, the public is not required to determine which is a correct statement and which is not.
Hunters are not required to rely on IDAP A as the "official text" when they are given as an
"official text" a publication from the State which provides contrary or unclear explanations of the
law. The Court insisted on showing the jury IDAP A. It, therefore, should have put all of the
other applicable laws into jury instructions, so as to not prejudice the defendant; namely IC 18114, 18-115, 18-201, and 36-502(b) as well as the information found in the "IDAHO BIG
GAME Seasons and Rules 201 0" brochure, which clearly creates a conflict in the information
provided about the law to the public by the State. It is a violation of due process for the state to
fail to clearly notify the public in its "official" hunting brochure as to the IDAP A law, if it
expects the public to follow the same.

Final Jury instruction #12
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"When the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did that which the law declares to be a
crime, it is no defense that the person did not know that the act was unlawful or that the person
believed it to be lawful."
Unless a person has criminal intent, a person cannot be held to a crime, unless they are guilty of
criminal negligence! It is a defense according to

Ie 18-201 that a person "did not know that the

act was unlawful or that the person believed it to be lawful." Therefore, the instruction was
erroneous and an incorrect statement of the law on its face. Furthennore, the word "voluntarily"
obscures the requirement of criminal intent or criminal negligence, although it implies it; which
means the instruction was confusing to the jury as a matter of law and denied Defendant due
process.

ARGUMENT OF ISSUES E. AND F.
E..

Whether the lower court committed plain error by precluding from evidence the

IDAHO BIG GAME Season and Rules 2010 brochure, while allowing the Plaintiffto admit
his marked sections.
F.

Whether it was error to deny the Defendant the opportunity to present his defense

of mistake of fact, which disproves criminal intent or criminal negligence based on
detrimental reliance upon the publication "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010",
a brochure which is the State's "official text" of the hunting rules.

Whether the limited

questioning allowed by the Court in cross examination of the State's witness as to the
brochure "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" was a denial of Defendant's
Constitutional due process right to confront witnesses against him. Whether the "IDAHO
BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" brochure was material evidence as to Defendant's
intent and exhibited a failure of the Idaho Fish and Game to properly notify hunters of rule
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changes.

Whether or not, the brochure's exclusion from evidence was a denial of

defendant's due process rights.
The IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure, the "official text", was allowed only
limited questioning in cross examination, see Trial transcript, and was precluded by "Order" in
Defendant's direct examination, suppressing evidence. The law requires the Idaho Fish and
Game to publish in a free brochure, a proclamation of the "official text", distributed to the
public, in order for the public to understand the rules and regulations.

Ie 36-105(c).
(c) The proclamation shall be published in a pamphlet or brochure as provided in
section 59-1012, Idaho Code, and distributed without charge to the public. The text
of the proclamation published in a pamphlet or brochure shall be the official text of
the proclamation. Judicial notice shall be taken of the proclamation pamphlet or
brochure. Emphasis added.

The Court was in error by failing to take judicial notice of the brochure and allowing it to be
admitted as evidence. See Trial Tr p. 42, In 17 thru p. 43, In 25. Further, it was in error by
stating "it does not seem as if the publication adds anything to assist the jury in deciding this
case." See the Court's Order on Motion to Reconsider, p. 5. Whether the proclamation adds
anything to assist the jury in deciding the case or not was not the judge's decision to make as it
was a part of Defendant's theory of the case and the brochure existed, and was a fact that the jury
was entitled to consider as a matter oflaw. It is the "official text" of the Big Game hunting rules
and should have been allowed into evidence. Because it was not allowed into evidence the jury
was misinformed as to the facts and circumstances that surrounded Defendant's alleged
violation. To preclude the "brochure" from full examination and evidence was to disregard it as
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the "official text", which is exactly what the magistrate did. Magistrate Clark made an error
when he ruled it was a matter of law whether or not the brochure properly notified the defendant
of the rule change. It is a matter oflaw whether the Idaho Fish and Game were required to
properly notify hunters of the rule change in an "official text" of the proclamation. It is a matter
of fact whether they did or not! The jury should have made this determination, not the judge.

The defendant argued vehemently that the brochure failed to properly notify hunters of the 1999
rule change, which made it illegal to hunt in more than one zone. The defendant made the
following argument to the Magistrate, but still was denied the right to have the "brochure"
entered into evidence. See VoLl -122, Objections to Jury Instructions and Brief in support of
Motion to Reconsider.
"The words in IDAP A are not the same as the words in the brochure."
IDAP A 13.01.08.255.01

01. Elk Zone A Tag. The Elk Zone A Tag is valid for specified A Tag elk
seasons within a specified elk zone only. (7-1-99)

IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure

"Elk Hunting in Idaho is managed in 29 elk zones. In addition, Fish and Game has
established a 2-tag system as an effort to offer elk hunters the most general season
choices. Hunters may select 1 zone and choose either an "A tag" or a "B tag" in most elk
zones."

Note: This paragraph is not found in the Big Game Rules section. It is found in a general
section, which is seldom read by experienced hunters.
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The language in IDAP A states that tags are valid in "specified" elk zones. But note the lack of
the word "only" and the emphasis on a "2-tag system" in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and
Rules 2010 "in most elk zones." The words "may select" and "in most elk zones" prefaced by "a
2-tag system" and not a "1 zone, 2-tag system", opens the door for "ignorance and mistake of
fact" by hunters, especially in light of the fact that the rule was changed in 1999. The State
should be estopped from prosecuting this violation as a crime, when the State creates an
inconsistency in the "official" public advisory about the law; which advisory is intended by the
State of Idaho to inform members of the public how they can comply with the law. The lack of
fairness is overwhelming.
Furthermore, Page 3 of the "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" brochure, fourth
paragraph from the bottom, states the following words:
"Detailed" big game hunting rules and restrictions begin on page 64. License requirements and
fees begin on page 92."
Most if not all hunters who want to refresh their memories or learn the rules for the first time will
then tum to page 64, where the hunter is not prompted to go to any other source, such as the
internet, for more details on the rules. There hunters will find no rules or restrictions about
hunting in more than one zone or any mention of "A" and "B" tags. This is exactly what the
defendant did, since it had been awhile, eleven years, since he had hunted elk. Once a hunter
reads the rules, he then turns to the species section he wants to hunt. Page 1 of the elk section is
for new elk hunters. In other words hunters who have never hunted in Idaho or who don't know
the difference between a spike and a branched antler bull. Put another way, not the place you
would expect to find the only mention of the zone and tag restrictions, as ambiguous as it is.
Most seasoned elk hunters do not even look at the first page. They know what a spike is! They
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go to the zone pages to try and figure out when and where they want to hunt. That in itself is an
arduous task. Please see the "brochure" to affirm this point. To add to the confusion of the zone
A and B tag system, some zones have quotas. One may ask: Why does the Fish and Game put

quotas on general season hunts? Limits on tags in specific areas are typically put in the
controlled hunt section. The Magistrate stated the brochure would only "confuse" the jury. This
is the very point raised by Defendant, i.e., this is what confused the Defendant. And this is the
very reason why the brochure needed to be admitted as evidence in support of defendant's theory
of defense.
It is deceptive when the brochure uses the word "detailed", on page 3, to describe the section on
rule to then expect any further analysis. Hunters are not expected to be lmvyers in order to
lawfully engage in this sport. How can a hunter be expected to obey the law when the law itself
is unclear and confusing? Or better yet, how can a hunter be expected to obey the law when the
law that the prosecution seeks to enforce cannot even be found in the "detailed" Big Game Rules
section? Where is the due process of "notice?" Thus, the Defendant was not put on "notice" of
the law change and the difference in the amended law, and without notice the Defendant was
denied due process as to the application of this statute to him in this situation as a matter of law.
The State cannot expect the public to go any further than to rely on the information in the rules
section of the "official text" to learn the law! Especially, if going further means that the public
must compare, contrast and make refined distinctions that only those trained in the law can
make. In computer parlance it would be said that these contrasting laws are not "user friendly." If
the word "general" replaced the word "detailed" on page 3, then hunters might be held to higher
standard of further investigation and knowing more about the law, but it didn't, which means
there was no notice of the distinction. The fact is the law, Ie. 36-105(c), requires the Idaho Fish
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and Game to "publish" their "proclamation" of new rules "in a pamphlet or brochure as provided
in section 59-1012, Idaho Code, and distributed without charge to the public" means that
members of the public, including Defendant have a legal right to rely upon said brochure. The
"IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" is the "official text of the rules" of Idaho Fish
and Game law. The Defendant, who is a member of the public, has a right to rely upon such
"official" publication and cannot be held criminally responsible for having done so. To hold
Defendant liable when he followed one version of the law is a "Catch 22." To deny him the
opportunity to present this information to the jury in cross examination of the State's witnesses,
and exclude this evidence from Defendant's case in chief, and fail to permit the brochure to go to
the jury as evidence and deny the Defendant the opportunity to argue the effect of the brochure
to the jury in closing and then deny Defendant the opportunity to have an instruction on his
theory of the case quoting from said brochure was an absolute denial of fundamental
constitutional due process of a fair trial.
A hunter cannot be expected to rely on any information other than the "official text" the
"IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" brochure.

To preclude the brochure from

evidence prejUdices the defendant's right to due process and the right to bring forth his theory of
defense. Because the brochure was precluded from evidence, this case should be dismissed or, in
the alternative, remanded for retrial to a new judge with an Order to allow the brochure into
evidence and full argument of its text in support of the defendant's theory of defense.

ARGUMENT OF ISSUE G.
G.

Whether the lower court committed plain error when it failed to dismiss based on a

lack of personal, territorial, and/or subject matter jurisdiction. The Court lacked personal,
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territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction and should have granted the Motion to Correct the
Record and Dismiss the Case. See VoLl -101.

Article 5, Section 1 of the Idaho State Constitution reads:

FORMS OF ACTION ABOLISHED.

1. The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such
actions and suits, are hereby prohibited; and there shall be in this state but one form
of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private
wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action; and every action prosecuted by

the people ofthe state as a party, against a person charged with a public offense.
(or the punishment ofthe same, shall be termed a criminal action.
2. Feigned issues are prohibited, and the fact at issue shall be tried by order of court
before a jury. Emphasis added.

The Plaintiff, STATE OF IDAHO is a corporation; EIN# 82-60000852, 82-60000952.
Defendant, "REX F. RAMMELL," is a false designation of an individual who does not exist as a
person in the state ofIdaho. Rex Floyd Rammell, is the real party of interest and he has declared
by a U.S. Constitution Ninth Amendment Proclamation that he is a freeholder in the American
sense and is anomesident of "this state" (STATE OF IDAHO), see Defendant's Exhibit "c"
attached to Defendant's Motion to Correct the Record. Rex Floyd Rammell, the real party of
interest, entered a Motion to Correct the Record and Dismiss the case. The Court denied the
Motion in error. An objection was properly and timely made and the issue properly preserved on
appeal.
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Furthennore, by charging REX F. RAMMELL with a crime as a person who does not exist the
State has brought a feigned issue (a criminal proceeding) before the Court, which is prohibited
by Article 5, Section 1 of the Idaho State Constitution. Only "criminal actions" by "the people of
the state as a party" may be brought against "a person charged with a public offense." Since
REX F. RAMMELL is not a person within the meaning of the Idaho State Constitution, the real
party of interest, Rex Floyd Rammell is not answerable to charges against such other individual.
Therefore, the issue whether REX F. RAMMELL committed a crime in the STATE OF IDAHO
was and is a feigned issue. Criminal "proceedings" by the STATE OF IDAHO, incorporated,
under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (not criminal actions by the "the people of the
state as a party) are prohibited.

Appellant requests this Honorable Court reverse the lower Court and Correct the Record and
dismiss the matter in STATE OF IDAHO v. REX F. RAMMELL for lack of jurisdiction. If
charges are to be brought forward they must come as a criminal action by the state of Idaho as a
party, against a real person, who is a de jure citizen named Rex Floyd Rammell, in accordance
with Article 5, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution and not against a fictitious person who does
not exist, such as REX F. RAMMELL.

V.
CONCLUSION
In hindsight, it is clear to the Appellant that magistrate and district judges cannot (will not) rule
contrary to case law, even if they would like to. It is also readily apparent that prior case law
(1902) when made in error, ignorantly or maliciously, has a cascade effect on future cases. Now
for over 100 years in this case and many before it. Legislative intent misapplied by the courts
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changes the law and has vast consequences. It is only through the wisdom of sitting Supreme
Court justices and solid arguments by appellants that error is evidenced and corrected. The
ruling in this case will continue a distortion of the true intent of the legislature allowing agencies
to severely punish citizens for minor mistakes or it will properly realign case law with statutory
law affecting thousands of criminal indictments that were the consequence of ignorance or
mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.

DATED THIS

f l day of July, 2012.
Rex Floyd Rammell

VI.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Service hereof has been made upon all parties required to be served on this Uday of July,
2012.

I served two copies of this Brief by mail on the Attorney for Respondent at the address

below.

,J£4i-~
Rex Floyd Rammell

Kenneth K. Jorgensen
Deputy Attorney General
Statehouse Mail
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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